This study tested the hypothesis that retarded and normal children of the same MA differ in their performance on a partially reinforced 3-choice learning task because they have differing expectancies of success. The performance of 60 normal lower-class (low expectancy) and 60 normal middleclass (high expectancy) Ss were compared with that of 60 noninstitutionalized retardates. J of the Ss in each group were assigned to a success, failure, or control condition which they experienced prior to performing on the criterion task, i of the Ss in each group were penalized for making errors on the criterion task while the other i were not. Normal lower-class Ss showed the most maximizing (correct responses) and the least left, middle, right patterning of their responses, while normal middle-class Ss showed the least maximizing and most patterning. Retarded Ss fell between these 2 groups on both measures.
A major controversy in the mental retardation area is that between general developmental and defect theorists (see Zigler, 1966a , for a complete discussion of this issue). The general developmental theorists (Zigler, 1966b) have argued that the familial retardate's cognitive development differs from that of the normal only in respect to its rate and the upper limit achieved. Such a view generates the prediction that when level of development is controlled, as is grossly done when groups of retardates and normals are matched on MA, there should be no difference in formal cognitive processes related to IQ. The defect theorists (Ellis, 1963; Goldstein, 1943; Kounin, 1941a Kounin, , 1941b Lewin, 1936; Luria, 19S6; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1959; Spitz, 1963; Zeaman, 1959) have argued that the retardate suffers from a spe-cine physiological or cognitive defect over and above the slower general rate of cognitive development. This view generates the prediction that even when level of cognitive development is controlled, as in the matched MA paradigm, differences in conceptual functioning related to IQ should be found. At face value, the repeated findings of differences in performance between groups of normals and retardates matched on MA have lent credence to the defect position and have cast doubt on the general developmental formulation. The general developmental theorist's response to these frequently reported differences has been to point out that performance on any experimental task is not the inexorable product of the S's cognitive structure alone, but is also influenced by a variety of emotional and motivational factors as well. According to this argument, differences in performance are more reasonably attributed to motivational differences which do not inhere in mental retardation but are rather the result of the particular histories of the typical retarded S.
While a number of such motivational differences have now been investigated (Zigler, 1966b) , this paper shall be confined to a consideration of the expectancy-of-success variable studied by Stevenson and Zigler (1958) and by Cromwell (1963) and his students. Stevenson and Zigler (1958) hypothesized that the inordinately high incidence of failure experienced by retarded children leads 343 to a lowered expectancy of reinforcement which in turn could account for certain differences in performance between normals and retardates matched on MA. To test this hypothesis, these investigators employed a threechoice discrimination task in which only one stimulus was partially reinforced, the other two stimuli yielding zero reinforcement. Although it is now clear that performance on such a task is influenced by a number of other factors (Gruen & Weir, 1964; Lewis, 1965 Lewis, , 1966 Stevenson & Weir, 1959 Weir, 1962 Weir, , 1964 , the Stevenson and Zigler (1958) rationale was that maximizing behavior (persistent choice of the partially reinforced stimulus) should be more characteristic of the retarded than the normal child since such children have come to expect and settle for lower degrees of success than have normal children. This rationale is consistent with Goodnow's (1955) analysis of the determinants of choice behavior. Goodnow suggested that greater maximizing behavior will be found when an 5 will accept less than 100% success as an acceptable outcome, while less maximizing behavior will be found when an S is expecting 100% success, or a level of success greater than that allowed in the situation. As Stevenson and Zigler (1958) predicted, retarded children were found to maximize their choice of the partially reinforced stimulus to a greater degree than normal children. Further support for the expectancyof-success hypothesis was found in a second experiment (Stevenson & Zigler, 1958) in which normal children were given either a success or failure condition prior to performing on the partially reinforced three-choice learning task. It was hypothesized that a preliminary failure experience would lower the expectancy of success and thus lead to a higher incidence of maximizing behavior. As predicted, a higher incidence of maximizing behavior was found for children who had experienced prior failure than for children who had experienced success.
It should be noted, however, that the difference in maximizing behavior between retardates and normals found by Stevenson and Zigler in their first experiment is consistent with a number of defect positions. These findings are certainly consonant with the LewinKounin rigidity formulation (Kounin, 194la, 1941b; Lewin, 1936) . Within this framework, maximization (consistently responding to one stimulus) could be conceptualized as perseverative, stereotyped behavior and the prediction generated that the inherently more rigid retarded child would maximize more than the less rigid normal child of the same MA. Some support for this interpretation of the Stevenson and Zigler (1958) findings is contained in the work of Siegel and Foshee (1960) who found that retarded children were less variable in their response patterns than were normal children of the same MA.
The major purpose of the present study was to provide a further test of the validity of Stevenson and Zigler's (1958) motivational explanation for the differences found in the performance of retardates and normals of the same MA on a partially reinforced threechoice problem. A procedure for differentially testing the Stevenson-Zigler motivational and Lewin-Kounin inherent rigidity positions suggests itself. If it is the lowered expectancy of success stemming from a high incidence of failure experiences that causes retardates to manifest maximizing behavior, then this same type of behavior should be found in children of normal intellect who have also experienced relatively high amounts of failure. Lowerclass children would appear to have had such a background (cf. Cans, 1962) . The motivational position would therefore predict similarity in performance on a partially reinforced three-choice problem by retardates and lower-class children. The position that rigidity is inversely related to IQ would lead us to expect a dissimilarity in the performance of these two groups and a similarity in the performance of lower-class and middle-class children matched on IQ.
In the present study, groups of middle-class normal, lower-class normal, and noninstitutionalized familial retarded children of comparable MAs were run on the partially reinforced three-choice learning task employed by Stevenson and Zigler (1958) . In order to throw further light on the possible motivational dynamics influencing performance on this task, two experimental manipulations were also utilized. As in Stevenson and Zigler's (1958) second experiment (which em-ployed only children of normal intellect) the degree of success experienced by children immediately prior to performance on the learning task was manipulated. One-third of the children in each group were administered a number of pretraining tasks in which they experienced a high degree of success; onethird were given pretraining tasks in which they experienced a very low level of success; one-third did not receive any pretraining. The expectation here was that the low, as compared to high, success condition would lower the child's general expectancy of success and thus result in more maximizing behavior on the learning task.
Penalty and no-penalty conditions were also included. Gruen and Weir (1964) , employing the same three-choice probability learning task as Stevenson and Zigler (1958) , found that penalizing children by having them give up a previously won reward for an incorrect response (denned as a trial on which 5 received no reward) resulted in greater maximizing behavior than did reward alone. In the present investigation, then, a 3 X 3 X 2 factorial design was employed involving three types of children (retarded, normal lowerclass, and normal middle-class), three pretraining conditions (success, failure, and control), and two penalty conditions (penalty versus no penalty).
METHOD Subjects
A total of 180 Ss, 90 boys and 90 girls, was employed. Sixty noninstitutionalized retarded children were drawn from special classes in the public schools of Worcester, Massachusetts. These 5s were all diagnosed as familial retardates and none exhibited gross sensory or motor disturbances. The 60 normal children constituting the lower-class group all resided in a government housing project for low-income families. No family earning more than $4,000 per year was allowed to live in the project, and the average yearly income was less than $3,000. This definition of lower socioeconomic class is consistent with that now being employed by governmental agencies. The 60 normal children constituting the middle-class group were drawn from various schools in predomi- nantly middle-class areas of Worcester. The fathers of these children were all employed in occupations conventionally designated as middle-class (Warner, 1960) . The mean CA, MA, and IQ of each group of children are presented in Table 1 . As can be seen in Table 1 , the mean IQ of the lower-class group was approximately 10 points lower than that of the middle-class group. Such a difference is typically found in social-class comparisons. Given the distributions of IQs found within the middle-and lowerclass populations, it was impossible to equate the two groups on IQ while at the same time equating them on MA. (As will be seen below, this difference in the mean IQs was taken into consideration in the analysis of the findings.) The 5s of each type were assigned randomly to the six experimental groups except for the provision that all groups be matched on MA and contain five boys and five girls. The IQ score for each S was obtained on an individually administered Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, Form B (Dunn, 1959) .
Apparatus
Four tasks were used, three experimental games and the criterion learning task. Two of the three experimental games used, the Pick-a-card Game and the Which School Game, were patterned after games previously employed by Stevenson and Zigler (19S8) and Butterfield and Zigler (196S) . All three experimental games were quite simple with performance depending primarily on compliance with E's instructions.
Materials for the Pick-a-card Game consisted of 10 cards, 5 of which had a red spot and S of which had a black spot on one side. The cards were constructed of 2X3 in. cardboard on which were mounted small rectangles of black or red paper. Materials for the Which School Game consisted of ten 3 X S in. glossy pictures of children which were placed into one of two boxes constructed to resemble buildings. One building was painted green and the other was painted pink. The boxes were placed about 6 in. apart and 12 in. in front of the 5 with their open sides facing 5. The apparatus for the Drop-a-marble Game, the third experimental game, was a slanted 18 X 22 in. board on which parallel rows of nails formed maze-like pathways. These pathways led from a point at the top of the board to two separate boxes, a green one and a black one, at the bottom of the board. This apparatus had an equal number of paths leading into the green and the black boxes through which marbles could be delivered. However, the openings of the lower pathways leading to the black box were slightly narrower than the openings of the pathways leading to the green box. Thus, only smaller-sized marbles could go into the black box, whereas marbles of two sizes could go into the green box. Ten marbles of i in. in diameter and 10 of I in. in diameter were used.
The apparatus for the probability learning task has been described in detail elsewhere (Stevenson & Zigler, 1958) . Essentially, it consisted of a yellow panel with a horizontal row of three circular, black knobs on its face. A red signal light was centered at the top of the panel, and a hole through which marbles could be delivered was centered at the bottom of the panel. The marbles fell into a plastic container. For 5s in the penalty condition, who were required to give up a marble each time they made an incorrect response, a marble board with SO holes in it was used into which 5 could place the marbles he had to give up.
Procedure
Each 5 was tested individually. The 5s in the success and failure conditions were initially presented the three experimental games in the order of Pick-acard Game, Which School, and Drop-a-marble and then received the learning task. The 5s in the control group were presented with only the criterion learning task. The E met 5 in his classroom and then conducted 5 to the experimental room which was arranged as constantly as possible from school to school. Upon entering the experimental room with 5, E pointed to a variety of inexpensive toys spread on a table and said: "Do you see all these toys here? If you could choose any of them to keep, which would you take?" After 5 made his choice, E said:
Fine. Now we're going to play some games. By playing the games well, you can win marbles. If you win enough marbles, you can trade them in for this [indicating the toy of the S's choice] when we are all through playing these games.
For 5s in the success and failure conditions, E introduced the first experimental game, Pick-a-card:
Here's the first game. It's called Pick-a-card. Here are the cards. Some have red spots on one side and some have black spots on one side. [The E shows 5 a red and a black card from, the deck.] Your job is to pick up cards whose spots are the same colors as the colors I have written down here on this piece of paper. Sometimes a red one is right and sometimes a black one is right. I'll spread the cards all over the table, like this [the E spreads the 10 cards before 5, plain side up]. When it's time for you to begin, you'll guess by turning the cards over one at a time and handing them to me. Every time you hand me a right colored card, I'll give you a marble. If you have enough marbles after we have played four games, you can have this [indicating the object of the child's preference]. You can keep the marbles in this marble board, and we'll count them after we have played several games to see if you have won enough marbles. All right, now you may begin picking up the cards, turning them over, and handing them to me one at a time. When you give me a right card, I'll give you a marble to put in your board.
In the course of turning over the cards Ss in the success condition received nine marbles and 5s in the failure condition received only one marble. The point(s) at which the marbles were given differed for each S according to a predetermined random schedule.
Following the game, E said: "Well, that's all of that game." The E then introduced the second experimental game, Which School: Now here's the next game. It's called Which School. Here are the two schools. One is pink and one is green. Here are some pictures of children. Each of these children goes to one of these schools. Your job is to guess which school each child goes to. You guess by taking the pictures one at a time and putting them in the school you think that child goes to. When you put the picture in the right school, I'll give you a marble. Here are the pictures. You put them in the schools one at a time.
The Ss in the success condition were given a marble on 9 of their 10 responses, regardless of which school they placed the pictures in. The Ss in the failure condition were given a marble on only 1 of their 10 responses. Following this game, E said: "Well, that's all of that game." The E then introduced the third game, Drop-a-marble:
Now, here's the next game. It's called Drop-amarble. When marbles are dropped in here [the E holds a marble at the top of the maze], they roll down this board into one of these two boxes. Your job is to get as many of the marbles as you can to roll into the green [black] box. You may drop only one marble at a time, but you may make it roll down either side of the board that you want. Here is the first marble. Remember, you want it to fall into the green [black] box, At the end of the game you can put the marbles that you get to roll into the green [black] box into your marble board.
The E gave S 10 marbles, 1 at a time. The Ss in both the success and failure conditions were given smaller marbles until one of them fell into the black box. From then on they were given larger marbles, which could only fall into the green box, until they had nine marbles in the green box. Thus, for all Ss, 90% of the marbles fell into the green box; E had designated this box as the correct box for Ss in the success condition and the incorrect box for Ss in the failure condition.
In each of the three experimental games, Ss in the success condition were given a marble on 90% of the trials. In addition, E made three positive statements to S at predetermined points during each of the experimental games. These statements always occurred on a response for which S was given a marble. The positive statements were: "That's good." "You really know how to play this game." "That's fine." In the failure condition, Ss were given a marble on only 10% of the trials in each experimental game. In addition, E made three negative statements at predetermined points during each of the experimental games. These statements always occurred following a response for which S was not given a marble. The negative statements were: "That's not good." "You don't play this game very well." "That's bad." For Ss in the success and failure conditions, following the last experimental game the E introduced the criterion task (the only task given to the control group): Now let's play this game. Do you see this light up here? [The E points to red signal light.] Well, every time it goes on you may push one of these three knobs. If you push the correct knob, a marble will fall out of this hole right here, like this [the E drops a marble through the hole in the plastic container]. So, every time this light goes on, your job is to push whichever knob you think will get you a marble. Try to win as many marbles as you can.
From this point on, the instructions for Ss in the penalty and no-penalty conditions differed.
[No-Penalty Group] When we're finished with this game, I'll count the number of marbles you have won to see if you have won enough to get a prize. Any questions? [Penalty Group] When you do win a marble, leave it in this box. But when you push a knob and you don't get a marble, I want you to take one marble from this box and give it to me. Now there may be times when you don't have any marbles in this box to give me. When that happens I'll just put a check here on this piece of paper so that I can keep track of how many you owe. At the end of the game, I'll count up the number of marbles you have won and the number you owe and if you have done well enough you'll win a prize. Any questions?
On this task, one knob was reinforced 66% of the times it was chosen and the other two knobs were never reinforced. Reinforcement was thus available on 66% of the responses to the correct knob, rather than on 66% of the total trials. The 66% reinforcement schedule was randomized in four blocks of 30 trials, and these were then broken down into 12 ten-trial blocks with the following restrictions: No S was allowed to have more than one nonreinforcement on the reinforcing knob prior to his first reinforcement on that knob. Also, no S was allowed to receive more than three consecutive nonreinforcements of his choices on the correct knob. Thus, 12 ten-trial blocks were constructed and Ss in each group were randomly started with 1 of these 12 blocks. Each S continued for 100 trials on this task. For each S one of the three knobs (either left, middle, or right) was designated as the correct knob. Three Ss in each group were reinforced for choosing the left knob, four for choosing the middle knob, and three for choosing the right knob.
At the end of the experiment, each S was instructed to count the number of marbles he had won and was told that he had won three more marbles than he needed to win his prize. All Ss were then given their prize, were praised extensively for their performance, and were returned to their classroom.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Correct Response Analysis
Preliminary analyses revealed that neither sex of the child nor knob position influenced performance, and, for the sake of simplicity, these variables were ignored in the analyses of the correct responses (CRs) reported below. The term "correct responses" refers to the trials on which 5 chose the reinforcing stimulus rather than one of the other two, regardless of whether or not it paid off. In keeping with the typical evaluation of this type of data, two major analyses were conducted, one including all experimental trials and the other including only the last block of 20 experimental trials (Trials 81 through 100).
The Type of S X Preliminary Condition X Penalty X Trials analysis of variance performed on the total number of CRs revealed significant main effects for type of S (7 and normal lower-class Ss were both significantly greater than the mean of the normal middle-class 5s (t -7.45, p < .001; and t = 9.13, p < .001, respectively). There was a tendency for the mean number of CRs to be greater for lower-class than for retarded 5s (t = 1.67, p < .10). The significant penalty effect reflects the higher number of CRs in the penalty (^ = 69.2) than in the no-penalty condition (£ = 60.8). The only other significant effects revealed in this analysis were the trials effect (F 4/648 = 130.5, p < .001), which reflects the increase in CRs over trials; and a significant Penalty X Trials interaction (F 4 /e« = 4.50, p < .01). As can be seen in Figure 1 this interaction was due to the steeper slopes of the learning curves in the penalty as compared to the no-penalty conditions.
The Type of 5 X Preliminary Condition X Penalty analysis of variance performed on the total number of CRs made during the last 20 experimental trials also revealed significant main effects for type of 5 (F 2 /ie2 = 11.87, p < .001) and penalty condition p<.005) . Further analyses revealed that the means of the retarded (% = 15.9) and the normal lower-class (X = 16.5) were both significantly greater than the mean of the normal middle-class (X -12.5) 5s (t -3.84, p < .01; and t = 4.52, p < .01, respectively) . The means of the retarded and lowerclass 5s did not differ significantly (t < 1.0).
The failure to find any significant effects associated with preliminary conditions (F < 1, in both analyses) is surprising in light of the Stevenson and Zigler (1958) finding of more maximization following preliminary failure than preliminary success experiences. It should be noted that the Stevenson-Zigler finding was obtained with children who were probably of the middle socioeconomic class. In order to assess the replicability of the Stevenson and Zigler (1958) finding, an individual analysis on the preliminary condition effects for each of the three types of 5 was performed. The data for these analyses are presented in Figure 2 . As can be seen in Figure 2 , no preliminary condition effects were found in the retarded and lower-class groups, findings consistent with the overall analysis. However, for middle-class children the preliminary success condition results in less maxi-mization than the other two conditions. Employing the final 20 trials measure, the difference in CRs between the failure (.£ = 13.8) and success (.£ = 11.0) conditions was found to be significant (£=1.74, p < .05; one-tailed test), a finding consistent with that reported earlier by Stevenson and Zigler (1958) .
In order to partial out any effects of differences among the groups on IQ, CA, and MA, three analyses of covariance were conducted on the data of the last 20 trials, employing each of the three subject variables as covariates. These analyses resulted in essentially the same findings reported in the original analysis.
Patterns of Response Analyses
It was felt that a more fine-grained analysis than that provided by overall performance curves would throw further light on the mechanisms underlying the differences in performance found between the groups. Earlier studies (Gruen & Weir, 1964; Stevenson & Weir, 1959; Weir, 1962) have demonstrated that when confronted with this task a common strategy of MA-seven children is a left, middle, right (LMR), or a right, middle, left (RML) response pattern, which accounts for about 50% of the total number of responses made. This pattern of responding can be viewed in two distinctly different ways: (a) the probability learning task is an insoluble one if the child assumes that there must be some way of obtaining a reward each time the knob is pressed. Given such a belief, the pattern response may represent a rather highorder strategy among a hierarchy of strategies whose order and total number are primarily a function of the child's MA level. Within this conceptual framework, perseveratively responding to a single knob would be thought of as a more primitive strategy, low in the strategy hierarchy of the MA-seven child though high in the hierarchy of the MA-three child; (b) the pattern response may be simply a stereotyped response which reflects the cognitive rigidity of a child.
If a is true, the pattern response is essentially a product of the cognitive level (e.g., MA) of the child and one would expect no differences between the three groups in the occurrence of such responding. If b is correct, then the Lewin-Kounin formulation generates the prediction that the amount of pattern responding should be inversely related to the IQ within an MA level. This implies that the retardates should have more pattern responses than the other two groups, with the middleclass group having the least number of such responses, since they have the highest IQ.
These possibilities were investigated in the present study by calculating the number of LMR and RML pattern responses made by each S. In addition, the total number of variable responses made by each 5 was counted. A variable response refers to a trial on which S chooses a stimulus different from the one he chose on the immediately preceding trial.
A Type of 5 X Preliminary Condition X Penalty X Trials covariance analysis was then performed on the pattern responses, with the variable responses as the covariate. This type of analysis was used in order to be sure that any group differences obtained in response patterning would not be attributed simply to the fact that certain groups made more variable responses (and thus, by chance, more patterns) than other groups. This analysis revealed a significant penalty effect (^i/iai = 11-05, p < .001) and a difference of borderline significance between the three types of S (F 2 /i8i = 2.30, p < .10). (See Figure 3 .) The mean number of pattern responses, controlled for variable responses, made by 5s in the penalty and no-penalty groups was 13.7 and 27.9, respectively. The mean number of pattern responses made by retarded, lower-, and middle-class 5s was 20.6, 17.6, and 25.3, respectively.
The tendency of the groups to differ and the ordering of the three groups on the patterning measure calls into question both the notion that the pattern response reflects a strategy dictated by the MA alone and the notion that it is a manifestation of rigidity which is greater at lower levels of IQ. That the pattern response is greatest in the middleclass group and that the partially reciprocal maximization response is least in this group is not without its importance. Some insight as to the exact relationship between the pattern-response strategy and maximization is provided by another significant effect found in the pattern analysis, a significant Type of 5 X Preliminary Condition interaction (Jf^/iei = 3.18, p < .05). This interaction reflects the fact that, whereas in the retarded and lowerclass groups there was no significant variation in pattern responses associated with preliminary condition, the condition did affect the number of pattern responses in the middleclass group (F 2 /54: = 3.65, p < .05). In this group the mean number of pattern responses made by 5s in the failure, control, and success conditions was 17.3, 24.3, 33.3, respectively. The pattern analysis also revealed a significant trials effect (F^w -10.2, p < .001), which reflects the decrease in pattern responses over trials, and a significant Trials X Type of 5 interaction (F 8 /647 = 6.29, p < .001). As can be seen in Figure 3 this interaction was due to the greater decrease over trials in pattern responses in the normal lowerclass and retarded groups than in the middleclass group. The more rapid decrease in pattern responses in the penalty than in the nopenalty conditions resulted in a significant Penalty X Trials interaction (F 4 / 6 4T = 10.65, p < .001). The Type of 5 X Preliminary Condition X Penalty X Trials interaction was also significant (Fie/m = 3.79, p < .001).
Conclusions
The findings obtained on the correctresponse measure in conjunction with those obtained on the pattern-response measure permit certain conclusions concerning the processes which mediate the performance of the three types of children. During the early trials, all children rely rather heavily on the pattern response, a strategy dictated by their cognitive level as defined by MA. Subsequently, the operation of a number of factors appears to determine the child's willingness to give up this cognitively congruent strategy for a maximization strategy which, though not meeting the goal of 100% success, does provide the best possible payoff. One such factor is the penalty involved in continuing to utilize the pattern strategy. Across all groups the penalty condition (punishment) causes the child to give up the pattern response in favor of the maximization strategy. This shift to a different strategy in the strategy hierarchy would appear to be predictable from the Law of Effect. However, independent of penalty effects, the three groups continue to differ in their tendency to make patterns which in turn produces differences among the three groups in the number of maximization responses. These remaining differences between the groups are not at all consistent with the position of a greater rigidity with lower IQ. The findings do appear consistent with the expectancy-of-success hypothesis advanced initially. In the middle-class child this expectancy is relatively high, and therefore he is unwilling to settle for that degree of success provided by the maximization response. Given such a situation he can do little more than continue with the patterning response which at this MA level would appear to represent a relatively complex strategy. On the other hand, the retarded and lower-class children have a lower expectancy of success and are therefore more willing to give up the patterning response in favor of the maximization response. The tendency for lower-class children to make fewer patterning and more maximizing responses is understandable if one remembers that the retardates in this study were obtained from special classes, whereas the lower-class children were obtained from classes in which they probably had to compete continually with brighter children. While this factor may be offset by nonschool experiences, it is very possible that the lower-class child in the middle-class-oriented schoolroom has more failure experiences than retardates in special classes conducted especially for them.
The importance of these success and failure experiences is suggested by the impact of the success-failure manipulations on the middleclass children in this study. As in the Stevenson and Zigler (1958) study greater maximization was found following failure than following success. At the same time success resulted in an increase and failure in a decrease in pattern responding in middle-class children. It would appear that the preliminary success experience enhances the child's confidence in the pattern strategy dictated by his cognitive level and thus increases his reluctance to give up this strategy when confronted with a problem that he thinks can be solved. This reasoning would appear to represent an extension of Stevenson and Zigler's expectancy-of-success hypothesis. The smaller number of correct responses on a probability learning task by a middle-class child would appear to be determined not only by the amount of success he is willing to settle for, but also by the amount of confidence the child has in his own cognitive strategy. That the retarded child has little confidence in his own cognitive resources has now been demonstrated (Turnure & Zigler, 1964 ). It would not be surprising to discover that the lower-class child who typically experiences a high incidence of intellectual failure also distrusts his own cognitive strategies and is therefore more willing to give them up than is the middle-class child.
This argument would have been strengthened had the success-failure effects found with the middle-class group also been found in the retarded and lower-class groups. However, as has been noted and demonstrated (McCoy & Zigler, 1968; Zigler, 1964) , it is naive to believe that simple shortterm experimental manipulations of the sort used in this study would inexorably affect all children to the same degree. How these short-term operations influence behavior will ultimately depend on how they are mediated by the S. The findings of the present study suggest that, unlike the middle-class child, the retardate and the lower-class child have such entrenched attitudes and expectancies that short-term experimental manipulations of success and failure have little effect on their performance. The fact that lowerclass children of normal intellect are more similar in their performance to retardates than to middle-class children of the same MA is consistent with other findings (Zigler & deLabry, 1962) and allows the conclusion that differences between retardates and middleclass children on a probability type task are due to motivational factors of the type which have been discussed rather than to any inherent cognitive rigidity of retarded individuals.
